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Should Tax Rates Decline with Age?
For nearly a century, economists have recognized that it is "advantageous
to . .. tax most the source of supply which is least elastic."' But although the
"inverse elasticity rule" is now a basic tenet of public economics,' it rarely
yields practicable prescriptions for tax policy.' For example, the inverse
elasticity rule would suggest that marginal tax rates should decrease as income
increases, 4 as taxes are more likely to disincentivize labor for high-income
individuals than for low- and moderate-income individuals.' However, such a
1. F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcoN. J. 47, 58 (1927). A source of
supply is "elastic" if "the quantity supplied responds substantially to changes in the price,"
whereas a source of supply is "inelastic" if "the quantity supplied responds only slightly to
changes in the price." N. GREGORY MANKIw, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 104-05 (2d ed.
2001).
2. See William J. Baumol, What Marshall Didn't Know: On the Twentieth Century's Contributions
to Economics, 115 Q. J. ECON. 1, 34-35 (2000).
3. See Peter A. Diamond, Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of
Optimal Marginal Tax Rates, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 83, 83 (1998) ("The public finance
community has recognized that the results deriving zero marginal tax rates at the top and
the bottom of the income distribution are of little or no relevance for policy.").
4. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111
YALE L.J. 1391, 1401 (2002) (reviewing DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000)) (explaining why "optimal tax theory
generally rejects progressive marginal rates").
5. See Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications,
84 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 24 (2002) (reporting that individuals who earn more than $1oo,ooo per
year are approximately three times as price-elastic as individuals who earn less than
$100,000 per year).
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policy may not be politically feasible 6-or normatively desirable'-on account of
its regressive implications.
Still, there is one segment of the workforce whose labor supply is highly
price-elastic and whose relative tax rates8 might be lowered without triggering
the political concerns and distributive qualms mentioned above: older
workers.' By one estimate, the price elasticity of labor supply-the percentage
increase in hours worked for every one percent increase in after-tax income-is
approximately three times as high for sixty-year-olds as it is for forty-year-
olds.'o Other estimates indicate an even more dramatic increase in labor supply
elasticity over age." Thus, the deadweight loss per dollar raised from income
taxation is much larger for taxes imposed on older Americans than for taxes
imposed on prime-age workers." Congress could raise the same amount of
revenue while generating less deadweight loss if it increased rates on prime-age
workers and lowered rates on older ones."
This Comment evaluates age-adjusted tax rates from the perspectives of
economic efficiency, distributive equity, and political feasibility.' 4 It presents
6. See Kim Dixon, Most Americans: "Tax the Rich but Not Me," REUTERS, Mar. 29, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62S44B20100329 (reporting that most
Americans -including a majority of Republicans- support progressive taxation).
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 511-12 (7th ed. 2007) ("Unfortunately,
attempts to minimize allocative inefficiency may clash with the distributive goals of tax
policy.").
8. This Comment takes no position on whether absolute income tax rates are too high or too
low. Its argument is limited to the claim that Congress should impose relatively lower rates
on older workers than on younger workers.
9. See infra Part III (discussing political and constitutional dimensions of age-adjusted tax
rates).
io. Eric French, The Effects of Health, Wealth, and Wages on Labour Supply and Retirement
Behaviour, 72 REv. EcoN. STUD. 395, 411 (2005).
11. See infra text accompanying note 20.
12. Cf MANIw, supra note i, at 811 (defining "deadweight loss" as "the fall in total surplus that
results from a market distortion, such as a tax").
13. The rate hike for prime-age workers would not need to be as large as the rate reduction for
older workers in order for such a reform to be revenue-neutral. In the year 2012, only about
four percent of the U.S. civilian labor force will be sixty-five or older. See Mitra Toossi,
Labor Force Projections to 2012: The Graying of the U.S. Workforce, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb.
2004, at 37, 49 tbl. 5. Thus, a one-percentage-point rate hike for prime-age workers would
increase tax receipts by many times more than a one-percentage-point cut for older workers
would reduce receipts.
14. Other commentators have considered the possibility of age-adjusted tax rates. See Lee Anne
Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAx L. REv. 1 (2005); Michael Kremer,
Should Taxes Be Independent of Age? (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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the first sustained case from a law-and-economics perspective for reducing
income tax rates on individuals as they enter old age. It also explains how age-
sensitive tax rates can be consistent with distributive equity objectives. Finally,
it shows the importance of reconciling optimal taxation theory with political
reality and constitutional law. Until now, tax theorists have derived optimal tax
rules without reference to political and constitutional constraints. By
incorporating political considerations into the optimal tax calculus, economists
and tax law scholars can generate policy prescriptions that not only are efficient
in theory but also stand a chance at implementation.
1. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF AGE-ADJUSTED TAX RATES
Economists of all political persuasions agree that income taxes
disincentivize labor to some degree," although they differ dramatically in their
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/papers-kremer; Matthew Weinzierl,
The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Taxes (Sept. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/mweinzierl/paper/AgeDependentTaxes.pdf. But
those commentators primarily consider age-based income tax reductions for the youth.
They either make only passing mention of relative rate reductions for older workers, see
Fennell & Stark, supra, at 41; Kremer, supra, at 25-26, or do not take older workers into
consideration at all, see Weinzierl, supra, at 14 ("I limit the sample to the ages 30 through 59
While this Comment was in the process of publication, a panel in the United Kingdom
led by Nobel laureate economist James Mirdees unveiled drafts of a sweeping plan for
reform of the British tax system, including two proposals that would effectively raise rates
for taxpayers under age fifty-five and lower rates for taxpayers between ages fifty-five and
sixty-five. See JAMES MIRRLEES ET AL., TAX By DESIGN (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at ch.
4, at 43-44), available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/design/ch4.pdf. The Mirrlees
proposals come on top of existing age-related elements of the U.K. tax system, such as the
phase-out of National Insurance contributions (NICs) for taxpayers between ages sixty and
sixty-five and a more generous personal allowance (the British analogue to the U.S. Tax
Code's personal exemption) for taxpayers over sixty-five. See id. at 5, 43-44; cf 26 U.S.C.
§ 151 (2006) (providing personal exemptions). Although the Mirrlees panel's proposals are
U.K.-specific, the general thrust of the panel's age-related reforms is consistent with the
core argument of this Comment. See Mirrlees et al., supra, at 47 ("As a broad direction for
reform, we ... think that ... tax and benefit rates ... could take better account of what we
know about people's responsiveness around retirement age.").
15. For instance, Paul Krugman, the outspokenly liberal Nobel laureate, and N. Gregory
Mankiw, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under George W. Bush, both
present this basic principle in their introductory economics textbooks. See PAUL KRUGMAN &
ROBIN WELLS, ECONOMICS 190 (2d ed. 2009) ("[H]igh marginal tax rates ... create major
incentive problems."); MANKIW, supra note 1, at 165 ("[B]ecause taxes distort incentives,
they cause markets to allocate resources inefficiently.").
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estimates of the magnitude of this effect.' 6 There are at least three reasons why
we might expect labor supply to be relatively insensitive to taxes. First, workers
may not respond to changes in their tax burden because they cannot
comprehend the intricacies of the Tax Code. Second, nonpecuniary factors
such as social pressure may lead individuals to remain in the workforce even
when marginal tax rates are extraordinarily high." Third, wage earners do not
necessarily have full control over their labor supply. It may be difficult for them
to slide along the "intensive margin" (that is, to adjust the number of hours
that they work per day or the number of weeks that they work per year)
because employers often demand a minimum number of hours from their
employees. By contrast, workers generally have much more freedom to make
choices at the "extensive margin," such as to exit the labor force entirely.'8
If individual workers cannot make marginal adjustments to their hours,
then we would expect the price elasticity of labor supply to be greater for
individuals who are considering exit from the workforce than for individuals
who might desire an incremental reduction in hours." In other words, we
would expect the disincentive effects of taxation to be greater around the
retirement decision than at midcareer. Empirical evidence largely supports this
intuition. According to one estimate using U.S. data, labor supply elasticity is
approximately 0.03 for thirty-year-olds, 0.24 for forty-year-olds, and 0.54 for
fifty-year-olds, but it rises rapidly to 1.42 for sixty-year-olds and 2.69 for sixty-
five-year-olds. 2 o These findings are consistent with elasticity estimates from
other advanced economies."
16. See Michiel Evers, Ruud de Mooij & Daniel van Vuuren, The Wage Elasticity of Labour
Supply: A Synthesis of Empirical Estimates, 156 DE ECONOMIST 25, 32 tbl.1 (2008) (Neth.)
(showing minimum price elasticity estimates for the labor supply of U.S. males as low as
0.22 and maximum price elasticity estimates for the labor supply of U.S. males as high as
0.25); id. at 33 tbl.2 (showing minimum price elasticity estimates for the labor supply of U.S.
females as low as -o.o8 and maximum price elasticity estimates for the labor supply of U.S.
females as high as 2.73).
17. Cf A. Georges L. Romme, Projecting Female Labor Supply: The Relevance of Social Norm
Change, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 85, 90 (1990) ("The social pressure to enter the labor force
differs according to age, upbringing, education, profession, peer group, region, etc.").
18. See Raj Chetty, et al., Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence
from Danish Tax Records, 125 QJ. EcoN. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1) (on file with
author) (presenting a model of intensive-margin labor supply in which "each firm requires
its employees to work a fixed number of hours because of an ex ante commitment to a
production technology" even when the employee would prefer to work less-or more).
ig. See French, supra note lo, at 397 n.2.
2o. Gopi Shah Goda, John B. Shoven & Sita Nataraj Slavov, A Tax on Work for the Elderly:
Medicare as a Secondary Payer 13 tbl.i (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
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One possible implication of this data is that high marginal tax rates on
older workers generate greater deadweight loss than similarly high rates on
prime-age individuals." However, if workers respond to tax incentives through
extensive-margin shifts rather than intensive-margin adjustments, then the
relevant statistic for older workers is not the marginal tax rate but the average
tax rate. In other words, if older workers are choosing between working forty
hours per week and not working at all, then their decisions will be influenced
by their expected aggregate tax liabilities, not the marginal tax rate on the last
hour worked.
Section 63 of the Internal Revenue Code already accords a small benefit to
senior citizens: the standard deduction increases by $1100 for individuals over
age sixty-five." However, this provision does nothing to reduce tax liabilities
for taxpayers over age sixty-five who itemize their deductions.' To implement
age-adjusted taxation for all taxpayers, Congress could amend § 151 of the
Internal Revenue Code such that individuals would be able to claim a larger
13383, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3383.pdf; see also French, supra
note o.
21. See, e.g., Paul de Hek & Frank van Erp, Analyzing Labour Supply of Elderly People 45 (2009),
available at http://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/analyzing-labour
-supply-elderly-people-life-cycle-approach.pdf (reporting "sharp increases" in the labor
supply elasticity of Dutch workers at "ages close to ... retirement").
22. Regarding the deadweight loss generated by high marginal tax rates for older workers, see
Leora Friedberg, The Labor Supply Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test, 82 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 48 (2000). Friedberg shows that in 1998, when the Social Security earnings test
reduced benefits for sixty-two- to sixty-four-year-olds by fifty cents for every dollar earned
above $9120-and reduced benefits for sixty-five- to sixty-nine-year-olds by thirty-three
cents for every dollar earned above $14,500-"the working elderly bunch[ed] in substantial
numbers at and just below the earnings exempt amount." Id. at 48; see also id. at 48-49
(noting that the price elasticity of labor supply for older workers "impl[ies] substantial
deadweight loss from the earnings test"). The Senior Citizens' Freedom To Work Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-182, 114 Star. 198 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402-403 (20o6)),
eliminated the earnings test.
23. The additional standard deduction of $11oo applies to married taxpayers over the age of
sixty-five; unmarried taxpayers over the age of sixty-five may increase their standard
deduction by $1400. See 26 U.S.C. § 63 (f) (20o6); Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.B. 622-
23. As of 2010, all taxpayers who did not itemize deductions on their returns were entitled to
a standard deduction of $5700 ($8400 for heads of household). See 26 U.S.C. § 63(a)-(c);
Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2oog-45 I.R.B. 622.
24. Taxpayers who itemize deductions on their tax return cannot claim the standard deduction.
See 26 U.S.C. § 63(b). Approximately thirty-four percent of all taxpayers choose to itemize.
See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ALL RETURNS: ADJUSTED GROSS
INCOME, EXEMPTIONS, DEDUCTIONS, AND TAX ITEMS, BY SIZE OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME
AND BY MARITAL STATUS, TAX YEAR 2008 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs
-soi/o8in12ms.xls.
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personal exemption as they age. 2s This would provide a benefit for itemizers
and nonitemizers alike, although it would not necessarily reduce marginal rates
for older taxpayers.26 Alternatively, Congress could choose to reduce marginal
rates for older workers in all tax brackets (which would, in turn, lower average
rates as well). The tax break could kick in gradually after workers pass a
particular age. For example, fifty-five-year-olds might be taxed at the same
marginal rate as younger workers with the same income; fifty-six-year-olds
might be eligible for a one-percentage-point reduction; fifty-seven-year-olds
might be eligible for a two-percentage-point reduction; and so on. This might
mitigate the tax deferral incentives that would arise if the reduction kicked in
all at once.
Questions about the details of an age-adjusted tax system lie beyond the
scope of this Comment. One might argue that age-adjusted tax rates should
take effect through deductions available to all older taxpayers (nonitemizers
and itemizers alike) without any change to the marginal rate schedule.
Alternately, one might argue that age adjustments should be integrated into
the marginal rate schedule set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 1. Regardless of the
implementation details, the core claim of this Comment remains the same:
because the price elasticity of labor supply increases over worker age, tax rates
should be lower for older workers than for younger ones. Such a system would
reduce the deadweight loss generated by the government's revenue-raising
activities.
25. Unlike the standard deduction, the personal exemption incorporates no age adjustment at
present. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 63(c)(3) (providing an additional standard deduction for the
aged), with id. § 151 (setting forth the statutory framework for the personal exemption and
not including any provision increasing the size of the exemption for older taxpayers). The
personal exemption amount is adjusted for inflation, see id. § 151(c)(4), and was $3650 for
2010, see Personal Exemptions and Dependents, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/cho3.html (last updated Mar. 23, 2011).
26. Increasing the personal exemption would only affect marginal rates for taxpayers who
moved into a lower bracket as a result of the reform.
27. Cf Kremer, supra note 14, at 26 n.21 ("One problem with lowering marginal tax rates for
senior citizens is that workers just below the age of eligibility might arrange with their
employers to postpone receiving income until after they are eligible for the program.").
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II. DISTRIBUTIVE EQUITY AND AGE-ADJUSTED TAX RATES
Distributive equity stands side-by-side with efficiency as an objective of the
Tax Code. 5 Commentators on tax policy often classify equity concerns into
two categories: "horizontal equity" (the premise that "[u]nits with the same
level of well-being should be liable for the same tax"") and "vertical equity"
(the premise that "people with greater income [should] pay greater amounts of
that income in tax""o). At first glance, age-adjusted tax rates might seem to
conflict with the principle of horizontal equity, as a forty-year-old and a sixty-
five-year-old with the same income would face different tax bills. Yet this fact
only raises horizontal equity concerns if an individual's "well-being" is
measured according to annual income. If horizontal equity is judged over the
course of a lifetime," the forty-year-old may end up paying just as much total
tax as his older counterpart.
Admittedly, age-adjusted tax rates may generate disparities between
individuals whose lifetime earnings are front-loaded (for example, those who
garner the majority of their income in the first few decades of their working
lives) and individuals whose earnings are spread more evenly over the course of
a long career. Under an age-adjusted tax system with reduced rates for older
workers, an individual who earns $40,000 a year over the course of fifty years
would pay less in lifetime taxes than would an individual who earns $400,000
a year for five years and then retires. However, even if the time value of money
is zero, horizontal equity does not demand equal tax treatment of these two
hypothetical cases. The early retiree does not necessarily have the "same level of
well-being" as the lifelong worker. Rather, the early retiree substitutes leisure
for income but still experiences "well-being" (albeit in an untaxed form) after
exiting the workforce. Thus, from a horizontal equity perspective, the status
quo "undertaxes" early retirees and "overtaxes" individuals with longer careers
28. See Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the
Income Tax, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 135, 135 (1996) ("[I]deal tax policy ... is concerned about the
equity (distributive effects) and efficiency of the tax system.").
29. Robert Plotnick, A Measure of Horizontal Equity, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 283, 283 (1981). But
see Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139
(1989) (doubting whether horizontal equity can be justified as an independent objective for
tax policy).
30. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIEs 28 (6th ed. 2009).
31. See Plotnick, supra note 29, at 285.
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(who consume less leisure over the course of their lifetimes)." In this respect,
age-adjusted tax rates, rather than undermining horizontal equity, may actually
offset the inequitable effects of the nontaxation of leisure."
One lingering concern regarding age-adjusted tax rates is that such a policy
does run the risk of penalizing individuals who exit the workforce early on
account of poor health; such individuals would accumulate lower levels of
savings, because they would pay higher taxes in their productive years.
However, this concern is mitigated by the finding that "economic factors rather
than health play the major role in retirement decisions."3 4 Moreover, even if
health is a dominant determinant of early retirement, and even if the
redistribution of wealth from the healthy to the sick is a policy priority, more
effective tools exist to accomplish this end (for example, Social Security
Disability Insurance and subsidies for long-term health care). It may still be
optimal to shift more of the tax burden to prime-age workers-and to couple
that shift with targeted programs for the sick and disabled-rather than
retaining the current system of age-insensitive marginal rates.
Not only are age-adjusted tax rates potentially compatible with concerns
regarding horizontal equity, but age-adjusted tax rates can also facilitate
further redistribution of wealth. If society sets the level of redistribution such
that the marginal benefits of additional redistribution offset the deadweight
loss of additional taxation," then reforms that reduce the deadweight loss of
taxation should increase the quantity of redistribution. This argument springs
from the realization that if more of the tax burden fell on the middle-aged
(rather than the elderly), the effect of revenue-raising on economic output
would be less dramatic. Since revenue-raising would be less costly (in terms of
32. See Ross Parish & Yew-Kwang Ng, Monopoly, X-Efficiency and the Measurement of Welfare
Loss, 39 ECONOMICA 301, 307 (1972) (lamenting the "obvious" inefficiency that arises from
the "under-taxation of leisure").
33. Individuals whose lifetime earnings are front-loaded already suffer from the tax penalty on
income volatility. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered,
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2003). Whether the tax penalty for income volatility and the tax
subsidy for leisure fully offset each other-or whether age-adjusted tax rates must be added
to the mix in order to achieve horizontal equity-is a question too complex to address within
the space constraints of a Comment.
34. See Gloria J. Bazzoli, The Early Retirement Decision: New Empirical Evidence on the Influence of
Health, 20 J. HUM. RESOURCES 214, 232-33 (1985). But see Debra Sabatini Dwyer & Olivia S.
Mitchell, Health Problems as Determinants of Retirement: Are Self-Related Measures
Endogenous?, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 173, 188 (1999) (noting that "health problems . . . have a
potent influence on encouraging earlier retirement," although "[e]conomic effects remain
statistically significant after controlling for health problems").
35. See Edgar K. Browning, The Marginal Welfare Cost of Income Redistribution, S. EcON. J., July
1978, at i (developing measures of the marginal welfare cost of redistribution).
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its total economic impact), then the notion of raising an additional one dollar
in revenue through taxes and redistributing to the poor through transfer
programs would seem more attractive. In other words, making the tax system
more efficient may be an important first step toward making the distribution of
wealth more equitable.
III.POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
One persistent shortcoming of optimal taxation theory is that it often
generates policy prescriptions that are politically infeasible and/or
constitutionally impermissible. For example, economists recognize that
married women are more likely than other demographic groups to curtail their
output of labor in response to high tax rates;" thus, the inverse elasticity rule
would suggest that married women should be taxed at a lower rate than men
and single females." But such a policy would raise serious constitutional
questions; as it would appear to discriminate on the basis of gender"' (and on
36. See, e.g., James J. Heckman, What Has Been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past Twenty
Years?, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 116, 117-18 (1993) (reviewing the relevant literature and
concluding that "[m]arried female wage and income elasticities . . . are generally . . .
somewhat larger in absolute value than male labor supply elasticities").
37. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Theory and Practice of Taxing Diference, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 654
(1998) (reviewing EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997)); see also Alberto Alesina,
Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family
Chores 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13638, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3638 ("The labor supply of women is more elastic than the
labor supply of men. Therefore, tax rates on labor income should be lower for women than
for men.").
38. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (stating that the government must
proffer an "'exceedingly persuasive"' justification for "official classification based on
gender," and that the government "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 202 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court "has consistently rejected the use of sex as a
decisionmaking factor even though the statutes in question certainly rested on .. . predictive
empirical relationships"). Two years before Craig v. Boren was decided, the Supreme Court
voted 6 to 3 to uphold a Florida statute granting an annual five-hundred-dollar property tax
exemption to widows but not to widowers. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). It is not
clear whether the current Court would follow Kahn. Well before she became a Justice, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg-who represented the widower challenging the constitutionality of the
Florida statute in Kahn-suggested that the case was wrongly decided. See Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7-8
("Kahn indicated a Court without sharp perception of the root causes and fundamental
unfairness of gender lines in the law. . . .").
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the basis of marital status"). Even if such a policy passed constitutional
muster, "it [w]ould be professional suicide [for a politician] to advocate a
policy that goes so far as to reduce the tax rate on women below that imposed
upon men."4 Other applications of optimal taxation theory are even more far-
fetched: for example, N. Gregory Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl have argued
quite cleverly (and "somewhat facetiously") that optimal taxation theory
supports a tax on human height, since height is a (rough) proxy for income
but, unlike income, is exogenous to the tax rate. In other words, whereas
high-ability individuals can reduce their tax bill by reducing their labor output
(which in turn yields deadweight loss), it would be difficult for tall individuals
to avoid the height tax. Yet even Mankiw and Weinzierl acknowledge that
"[m]any readers will find the idea of a height tax absurd," even though it
"follows ineluctably from . . . the dominant modern approach to optimal
income taxation." 4  It is not surprising, then, that even defenders of optimal
taxation theory acknowledge that the "theory has supplied little in the way of
concrete guidance concerning the design of actual tax systems."
Age-adjusted tax rates, by contrast, exploit demographic differences in
economic behavior and can be reconciled with political and constitutional
constraints. Unlike height-adjusted tax rates, age-adjusted tax rates do not lie
in the realm of the absurd. During the 2008 campaign, then-Senator Obama
touted a plan to "eliminate all income taxation of seniors making less than
39. Cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding that a law violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it "provid[es] dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried
persons who are similarly situated"). Note, however, that federal courts have consistently
upheld provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that establish different rate structures for
married and unmarried individuals. See, e.g., Druker v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982);
Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978); McCarty v. United States, No. oi-
4942, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2004); Johnson v. United States, 422 F.
Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
40. Staudt, supra note 37, at 68o (also noting that a "tax law that provided incentives for women
to work in the waged labor force" could be caricatured as "anti-family").
41. This One's for All the Little People Out There, EcONoMIX (Sept. 23, 2009, 3:14 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/o9/23/this-ones-for-all-the-little-people-out
-there.
42. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of
Utilitarian Income Redistribution, 2 Am. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 155 (201o). By one estimation
method, each extra inch of height yields $728 to $897 in additional annual earnings.
Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect ofPhysical Height on Workplace Success and
Income: Preliminary Test ofa Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 428, 435 (2004).
43. Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 42, at 156.
44. Richard Arnott, Reflections on Optimal Tax Theory, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 257, 257
(John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994).
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$50,000 per year." 5 Although President Obama has let this proposal remain
dormant since his inauguration,46 the Tax Code already contains (modest) age-
related provisions. For example, taxpayers who are sixty-five and older are
entitled to an additional standard deduction of $11oo on top of the $5700
standard deduction for all filers. This deduction does not yield relief for older
taxpayers who itemize their deductions,*8 and there is no indication that it was
motivated by optimal taxation theory," but, nonetheless, the very existence
and persistence of age-conscious provisions in the Tax Code suggest that age-
adjusted rates are politically feasible and robust to constitutional challenges.
Importantly, the immediate beneficiaries of this Comment's proposal are
also a politically powerful constituency: the AARP is "one of the most powerful
lobbying groups in Washington,""o and Americans between ages sixty-five and
seventy-four are more likely to vote than their counterparts in any other age
range." Senior citizens (sixty-five and older) constitute about thirteen percent
of the U.S. population but accounted for twenty-one percent of the 2010
45. OBAMA FOR AM., BARACK OBAMA'S COMPREHENSIVE TAx PLAN 2 (2008), available at
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/FactsheetTaxPlanFINAL.pdf. Obama made no
mention of deadweight loss or the inverse elasticity rule at the time. See Senator Barack
Obama, Tax Fairness for the Middle Class, Remarks at the Tax Policy Center, Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/upload/20070918
obama.pdf.
46. Angie Drobnic Holan, No Proposal To End Taxes for Seniors Making Less than $50,000, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES POLITIFACT.COM (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o
-meter/promises/promise/24/end-income-tax-for-seniors-making-less-than.
47. See supra note 23.
48. Taxpayers who itemize their deductions are not eligible for the additional $11oo standard
deduction. See 26 U.S.C. § 63 (20o6); see also Standard or Itemized Deductions, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/o,,id=
ool,oo.html ("Most taxpayers have a choice of either taking a standard deduction or
itemizing their deductions.").
49. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 88-830, at 30 (1964), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1964, at 2532 (1966) (offering a "[g]eneral explanation" of the proposal to
increase the standard deduction for taxpayers over age sixty-five and making no mention of
the inverse elasticity rule).
so. See Brian Dakss, AARP's Clout, and Social Security: Potent Machine Pointed Against Bush's
Proposed Changes, CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 26, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo5/
o8/26/6oll/main797804.shtml.
si. See THOM FILE & SARAH CRISSEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE
ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 4 tbl.2 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/201opubs/p20-562.pdf.
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midterm electorate," suggesting that their political power is disproportionate
to their (growing) numbers. Age-adjusted tax rates are consistent with interest
group politics and optimal taxation theory-a rare (and perhaps unique)
congruence.
Moreover, whereas the constitutionality of gender-based taxation schemes"
would be subject to "heightened scrutiny,"5 4 age is not "a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis."ss The Supreme Court has said it will
only overturn age-related distinctions if "the varying treatment of different
groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of
legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions
were irrational.", 6 The Tax Court has repeatedly rejected suits challenging tax
statutes on age-discrimination grounds. For instance, in Woolf v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court considered a challenge to a provision that allowed certain
individuals over age fifty-five to sell their homes without paying taxes on the
capital gains. 7 The court concluded that the preferential treatment of older
taxpayers was part of "a reasonable attempt by Congress to provide adequately
for those individuals who, because of their age and particular situation in life,
52. Steven Thomma & William Douglas, The 2olo Electorate: Old, White, Rich, and Republican,
McCLATcHY NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.Com1/2oo/11/22/104144/
the-2oo-electorate-old-white.html.
53. See Alesina et al., supra note 37.
54. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) ("[S]tatutory
classifications that distinguish between males and females are subject to heightened
scrutiny. For a gender-based classification to withstand such scrutiny, it must 'serv[e]
important governmental objectives,' and 'the discriminatory means employed [must be]
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' (quoting United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
ss. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (stating that a "suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis" is "one saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process,"' and concluding that "[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons . . . have not experienced a 'history of
purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities" (quoting San Antonio Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
s6. Vance v. Bradley, 44o U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (upholding a federal statute that imposed a
mandatory retirement age of sixty on Foreign Service members and certain other State
Department employees).
57. 1981 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 458 (June II, 1981).
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may desire to change residences."s" Similarly, in Baldwin v. Commissioner, the
Tax Court considered a challenge to a program under which individuals whose
incomes fluctuated dramatically year-to-year were allowed to average their
incomes over a five-year period (and thus reduce their marginal tax rates).s
Individuals age twenty-five and over were eligible for income averaging as long
6,
as they had been out of school for at least four years since age twenty-one.
The Tax Court roundly rejected a constitutional challenge brought by a
taxpayer who was ineligible for income averaging because he had not been out
of school for four years and had not yet reached age twenty-five. According to
the court, the Revenue Act's restrictions on income averaging "b[ore] a rational
relation to a legitimate government purpose" by "provid[ing] income
averaging relief to those persons who, in fact, have been unemployed."6 With
decades of economic theory supporting the rationality of age-adjusted tax rates,
it seems unlikely that the courts would deviate from the deferential approach
established by Baldwin and Woolf
CONCLUSION
Although the inverse elasticity rule has been a central tenet of optimal
taxation theory for the better part of a century, tax law scholars are beginning
to realize that the optimal tax system might incorporate age-adjusted rates." In
particular, the idea of lower relative rates for older workers has received short
shrift from the tax law community. This Comment seeks to rectify that
oversight. It shows why reduced rates for older workers are desirable from the
perspective of economic efficiency, consistent with distributive equity, and
feasible in light of political and constitutional constraints. While much work
remains to be done regarding the implementation details of an age-adjusted tax
system, this Comment shows that age-adjusted tax rates represent a rare
instance in which optimal taxation theory can generate practicable policy
prescriptions.
DANIEL HEMEL
58. Id. at *1o. In Bartley v. Commissioner, 1998 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 324 (Sept. 1o, 1998), the
Tax Court reaffirmed its holding in Woolf
59. 84 T.C. 859 (1985). See generally Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years:
A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DuKE L.J. 509, 512-23 (explaining the
mechanics of income averaging).
6o. Baldwin, 84 T.C. at 866; see Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232(a), 78 Stat. 19,
107 (repealed 1986).
61. Baldwin, 84 T.C. at 869.
62. See sources cited supra note 14.
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